

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

CHAD POLITOWITZ	*	DOCKET NO. 26cv464
v.	*	JURY TRIAL DEMAND
KRISTOFER FISHER; LIAM FLANAGAN; STATE OF CONNECTICUT	*	March 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2026

COMPLAINT

1. At all times relevant herein, the Plaintiff, Chad Politowitz, was a resident of the Town of Griswold, Connecticut.
2. At all times relevant herein, the Defendant, Kristofer Fisher, was a resident of Connecticut and was employed as a Trooper First Class by the Connecticut State Police Department. He is sued in his official and individual capacity.
3. At all times relevant herein, the Defendant Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection ("DESPP") is an agency of the State of Connecticut responsible for the operation, supervision, training, discipline and oversight of the Connecticut State Police ("CSP").
4. At all times relevant herein, the Defendant, Liam Flanagan, Connecticut and was employed as a Trooper

First Class by the Connecticut State Police. He is sued in his official and individual capacity.

5. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff's Fisher and Flanagan were acting in the course and scope of their employment with the CSP; and therefore, the State of Connecticut, and in furtherance of their employment with the CSP.
6. On or about April 23, 2024, the Plaintiff was a patron of the Jacques Cartier Club, located in the Town of Jewett City, Connecticut.
7. On the same day and at the same time, unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, Defendant Kristofer Fisher was lurking outside of the Jacques Cartier Club, waiting for the Plaintiff to exit the establishment.
8. Upon the Plaintiff exiting the establishment and beginning to drive away, Defendant Fisher followed behind the Plaintiff and initiated a traffic stop in his privately owned vehicle.
9. During the traffic stop, Defendant Fisher failed to properly identify himself, handcuffed the Plaintiff without providing an opportunity for field sobriety tests, and subsequently contacted Troop E for backup.

10. The investigation conducted by Defendant Flanagan was initiated solely because of the unauthorized actions of Defendant Fisher.
11. But for Defendant Fisher's unauthorized surveillance, pursuit, and traffic stop of the Plaintiff, no investigation by Defendant Flanagan would have occurred.
12. The Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested for driving under the influence, despite the absence of probable cause to believe that he was intoxicated.
13. The Plaintiff was not intoxicated at the time of the arrest.
14. He was prosecuted by the State of Connecticut, hired a lawyer and had to appear in Court for legal proceedings; resulting in a Nolle Prose.
15. Following the Plaintiff's arrest, a local newspaper, The Day, published an article on April 27, 2024, reporting the Plaintiff's arrest and the criminal charges against him.
16. The publication identified the Plaintiff by name and home address, associating him publicly with criminal conduct.

17. As a result of said publication, the Plaintiff suffered public embarrassment, reputational harm, and stigma within his community.
18. That publication and the resulting harm were a foreseeable consequence of Defendant Fisher's and Flanagan's actions.
19. Following a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative hearing, Plaintiff's license was administratively suspended and he became obligated to install an IID in his vehicle; however, at his first court date the DUI-related charges were dismissed.
20. The Plaintiff incurred significant financial and emotional costs because of these wrongful proceedings.
21. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Fisher was acting outside the scope of his lawful authority, and upon information and belief, was off duty at the time of the occurrence. Defendant Flanagan was on duty and followed Defendant Fisher's instructions to arrest Plaintiff.
22. Prior to the events described herein, the Plaintiff was involved in a personal relationship with the wife of Defendant Fisher.
23. At some point, Defendant Fisher became aware of said relationship.

24. Following his discovery of that relationship, Defendant Fisher engaged in a pattern of hostile, threatening, and intimidating conduct toward the Plaintiff via text messages and phone calls.
25. On one or more occasions, Defendant Fisher told the Plaintiff to kill himself.
26. On one or more occasions, Defendant Fisher threatened to kill the Plaintiff, both directly and indirectly.
27. Defendant Fisher at one time texted the Plaintiff that there was a "hit" out on him.
28. Said threats were made outside of the scope of any legitimate law enforcement purpose and were personal in nature.
29. Defendant Fisher's conduct toward the Plaintiff, including the conduct in this Complaint, was motivated by personal animus and retaliation, rather than any lawful policing objective.
30. The traffic stop, seizure and subsequent events described herein were a continuation of Defendant Fisher's personal vendetta and abuse of authority.
31. As a result of the events described herein, Defendant Fisher became the subject of an Internal Affairs Investigation conducted by the Defendant DESSP and it's body the CSP.

32. The Internal Affairs Investigation concerned Defendant Fisher's conduct in connection with the Plaintiff, including his unauthorized investigation, traffic stop, and misuse of authority.
33. Upon information and belief, the Internal Affairs Investigation resulted in sustained findings of policy violations against Defendant Fisher.
34. The Defendant State of Connecticut through the CSP determined that disciplinary action would be imposed upon Defendant Fisher as a result of sustained policy violations.
35. The Defendant State of Connecticut through the CSP ultimately imposed a 29-day unpaid suspension upon Defendant Fisher.
36. The sustained policy violations confirm Defendant Fisher's conduct was unauthorized, improper, and outside accepted law enforcement standards.
37. Defendant Flanagan's conduct, however, was done while on duty exercising his authority and he had no good faith basis to do so.

**COUNT ONE: 42 U.S.C. §1983 - UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND ABUSE OF  
AUTHORITY (AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

38. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

39. Defendant Fisher, acting under the color of state law, deprived the Plaintiff of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

40. Defendant Fisher unlawfully seized the plaintiff without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

41. Defendant Fisher abused his position of authority to initiate a traffic stop motivated by personal animus.

42. Such conduct constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C §1983.

43. Defendant Fisher's actions were taken with malice, ill will, and deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

44. Defendant Fisher misused his position as a State Trooper to retaliate against the Plaintiff for personal reasons unrelated to law enforcement.

45. Defendant Fisher initiated an unauthorized investigation and traffic stop without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

46. Defendant Fisher's unlawful conduct foreseeably caused Defendant Flanagan to negligently rely upon his actions and/or instructions to initiate a perfunctory arrest of Plaintiff at the behest of Defendant Fisher.
47. The Plaintiff's arrest for driving under the influence was unsupported by probable cause and constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
48. The favorable termination of the criminal proceedings confirm the lack of a lawful basis for the Plaintiff's arrest.
49. The sustained Internal Affairs findings demonstrate that Defendant Fisher knowingly violated departmental policies and acted with deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
50. Defendant Fisher's conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an egregious abuse of power actionable under 42 U.S.C §1983.
51. The Plaintiff has been harmed and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
52. All of these acts occurred under color of state law.
53. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT TWO: 42 U.S.C. §1983 - UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND ABUSE OF  
AUTHORITY (AGAINST DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

54. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

55. Upon arriving at the scene, Defendant Flanagan unreasonably, negligently and/or intentionally relied on the information and/or instructions provided to him by Defendant Fisher in his arrest of the Plaintiff.

56. Defendant Flanagan did not conduct an adequate investigation of the Plaintiff; if any was done at all.

57. The Plaintiff's arrest for driving under the influence was unsupported by probable cause and constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

58. Defendant Flanagan's negligence and/or conduct directly caused the unreasonable seizure and prosecution of Plaintiff.

59. The favorable termination of the criminal proceedings confirms the lack of lawful basis for the Plaintiff's seizure, arrest and prosecution.

60. Defendant Flanagan's conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an egregious abuse of power actionable under 42 U.S.C §1983.
61. The Plaintiff has been harmed and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
62. All of these acts occurred under color of state law.
63. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT THREE: 42 U.S.C. §1983 - DEPARTMENTAL CUSTOM OR  
POLICY (AGAINST CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT)**

64. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.
65. The Defendant State of Connecticut, through the CSP, maintained policies, practices, or customs that permitted officers to misuse authority while off duty in the manner set out in this complaint.
66. The Defendant State of Connecticut, through it's body the CSP, should have known that the type of harm set out in this Complaint was the likely result of this policy, practice or custom.

67. The Defendant State of Connecticut through the CSP failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline Defendants Fisher and Flanagan.
68. Such failures were a reasonable foreseeable consequence and a direct cause of the constitutional violations suffered by the Plaintiff.
69. The Defendant State of Connecticut, through the DESSP and CSP's departmental custom or policy, permitted the Defendant Fisher to initiate the acts that foreseeably resulted in the unconstitutional seizure, arrest and subsequent prosecution by Defendant Flanagan.
70. The Plaintiff has been harmed and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
71. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT FOUR: 42 U.S.C. §1983 - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (AGAINST  
DEFENDANT FISHER)**

72. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

73. Defendant Fisher deprived the Plaintiff of liberty without due process of law guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
74. Defendant Fisher unlawfully compromised the Plaintiff's physical liberty and unlawfully restrained the Plaintiff's freedom of movement when he conducted a motor vehicle stop on the Plaintiff while off duty which resulted in the Plaintiff being falsely arrested.
75. The Plaintiff has been harmed and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
76. All of this was done under color of state law.
77. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT FIVE: 42 U.S.C. §1983 - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT**

**DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (AGAINST  
DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

78. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.
79. Defendant Flanagan deprived the Plaintiff of liberty without due process of law guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

80. Defendant Flanagan unlawfully compromised the Plaintiff's physical liberty and unlawfully restrained the Plaintiff's freedom of movement when he arrested the Plaintiff for driving under the influence without probable cause and relying on the information and/or instructions of Defendant Flanagan.
81. The Plaintiff has been harmed and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
82. All of these acts occurred under color of state law.
83. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT SIX: NEGLIGENCE (AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

84. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through -- fully set forth herein.
85. Defendant Fisher owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff as a State Trooper for Connecticut.
86. Defendant Fisher breached said duty of care by acting outside the scope of lawful authority and initiating an unjustified traffic stop while off duty.
87. The Plaintiff suffered damages as a result.
88. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENCE (AGAINST DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

89. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.
90. Defendant Flanagan owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff as a State Trooper for Connecticut.
91. Defendant Flanagan breached said duty of care by acting outside the scope of his lawful authority by arresting the Plaintiff based solely upon the information and/or instructions provided to him by Defendant Fisher.
92. The Plaintiff suffered damages as a result.
93. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT EIGHT: FALSE IMPRISONMENT (AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

94. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.
95. Defendant Fisher, while off-duty and outside the scope of lawful authority, approached the Plaintiff at his personal vehicle.
96. Defendant Fisher intentionally restrained the Plaintiff by placing him in handcuffs.

97. The Plaintiff did not consent to being restrained or handcuffed.
98. At the time the Plaintiff was handcuffed, Defendant Fisher did not possess probable cause or lawful justification to detain or arrest the Plaintiff.
99. Defendant Fisher's actions were personal in nature and not undertaken for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
100. The Plaintiff's freedom of movement was restricted against his will for a period of time until Defendant Flanagan arrived at the scene.
101. The restraint of the Plaintiff occurred prior to any independent investigation by Defendant Flanagan.
102. Defendant Flanagan further restricted the Plaintiff's freedom of movement by arresting the Plaintiff based solely upon the information and/or instructions provided to him by Defendant Fisher.
103. Defendant Fisher's intentional confinement of the Plaintiff was without legal authority or consent from the Plaintiff and therefore was unlawful.
104. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT NINE: FALSE IMPRISONMENT (AGAINST DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

105. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

106. Upon arriving at the scene, Defendant Flanagan relied on the information and/or instructions provided to him by Defendant Fisher in his arrest of the Plaintiff.

107. Defendant Flanagan did not conduct a full investigation of the Plaintiff.

108. Defendant Flanagan restricted the Plaintiff's freedom of movement by arresting the Plaintiff based solely upon the information and/or instructions provided to him by Defendant Fisher.

109. Defendant Flanagan detained and arrested the Plaintiff without probable cause or lawful justification.

110. Defendant Fisher and Defendant Flanagan's intentional confinement of the Plaintiff was without legal authority or consent from the Plaintiff and therefore was unlawful.

111. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT TEN: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS  
(AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

112. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

113. Defendant Fisher's conduct, including threats of death, intimidation, and misuse of police authority against a person with whom he had a personal grievance, constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct.

114. Said conduct was intended to, and/or recklessly did, cause emotional distress.

115. The Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result.

116. The incident has fostered a distrust of law enforcement in the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff is now afraid of the police in his own town.

117. In particular, the Plaintiff fears that there remains a hit out on him and he could be ambushed by another police officer at any moment.

118. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT ELEVEN: NEGLIGENT INFLECTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS**

**(AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

119. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

120. Defendant Fisher knew or should have known that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the Plaintiff emotional distress.

121. The Plaintiff's distress was foreseeable and severe.

122. The incident has fostered a distrust of police in the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff is now afraid of the police in his own town.

123. In particular, the Plaintiff fears that there remains a hit out on him and he could be ambushed by another police officer at any moment.

124. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT TWELVE: NEGLIGENT INFLECTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS**

**(AGAINST DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

125. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

126. Defendant Flanagan knew or should have known that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the Plaintiff emotional distress.

127. The Plaintiff's distress was foreseeable and severe.
128. The incident has fostered a distrust of police in the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff is now afraid of the police in his own town.
129. In particular, the Plaintiff fears that there remains a hit out on him and he could be ambushed by another police officer at any moment.
130. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT THIRTEEN: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS  
(AGAINST DEFENDANT CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT)**

131. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.
132. The Defendant Connecticut State Police Department maintained policies, practices, or customs that permitted officers to misuse authority while off duty.
133. By fostering this departmental custom and policy, the Defendant Connecticut State Police Department knew or should have known that the conduct of Defendants Fisher and Flanagan involved an unreasonable risk of causing the Plaintiff emotional distress.
134. The Plaintiff's distress was foreseeable and severe.

135. The incident has fostered a distrust of police in the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff is now afraid of the police in his own town.

136. In particular, the Plaintiff fears that there remains a hit out on him and he could be ambushed by another police officer at any moment.

137. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT FOURTEEN: DEFAMATION/REPUTATIONAL HARM (AGAINST DEFENDANT FISHER)**

138. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

139. Defendant Fisher's actions caused false statements and implications to be made regarding the Plaintiff's alleged criminal conduct.

140. Defendant Fisher's actions were undertaken in furtherance of a retaliatory motive.

141. Said statements resulted in public stigma, damage to reputation, and tangible legal consequences.

142. The Plaintiff suffered loss of reputation and personal dignity.

**143.** Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT FIFTEEN: DEFAMATION/REPUTATIONAL HARM (AGAINST  
DEFENDANT FLANAGAN)**

144. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

145. Defendant Flanagan's actions caused false statements and implications to be made regarding the Plaintiff's alleged criminal conduct.

146. Said statements resulted in public stigma, damage to reputation, and tangible legal consequences.

147. The Plaintiff suffered loss of reputation and personal dignity.

148. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

**COUNT SIXTEEN: DEFAMATION/REPUTATIONAL HARM (AGAINST  
DEFENDANT CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT)**

149. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 fully set forth herein.

150. The Defendant Connecticut State Police Department maintained policies, practices, or customs that permitted the Defendant officers to misuse the authority exercised in this case.

151. By fostering this departmental custom and policy, the Defendant Connecticut State Police Department caused

false statements and implications to be made regarding the Plaintiff's alleged criminal conduct.

152. Said statements resulted in public stigma, damage to reputation, and tangible legal consequences.

153. The Plaintiff suffered loss of reputation and personal dignity.

154. Defendant's acts described above were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages.

DEMAND FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands the following relief:

1. Actual, compensatory and just damages;
2. Punitive damages,
3. Attorney's fees and costs in accordance with 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
4. Such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

s/J. Patten Brown, III  
J. PATTEN BROWN, III  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this Complaint by J. Patten Brown, III was forwarded electronically via the Court's electronic filing system to all counsel of record this 27<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2026.

S/J. Patten Brown, III  
J. Patten Brown, III  
Attorney at Law