Yesterday, the Connecticut Auditors of Public Accounts (APA) released their audit of the state’s Judicial Branch, finding that they lost 27 bulletproof vests from 2023 to 2024. The audit also found various issues regarding grant disbursement, submission of state-mandated reports, and overtime administration.
“The Judicial Branch did not perform a thorough review into the missing vests,” reads the audit. “The lack of prudent maintenance of ballistic vests could lead to possession of restricted items by unauthorized individuals, which could pose a threat to public safety.”
Per state laws, private citizens can only sell or transfer bulletproof vests in-person to those who “possess a local gun dealer permit, pistol or revolver permit, eligibility certificate for a handgun or long gun, or ammunition certificate,” said the auditors. These restrictions do not apply to marshals, probation officers, or other Judicial Branch officials who purchase body armor on their behalf. Per Judicial Branch policy, bulletproof vests should be kept in locked storage when not in use.
“The Judicial Branch did not have adequate internal controls over ballistic vests,” reads the audit. “Our review of loss reports submitted during the audited period disclosed that the Judicial Branch reported 30 ballistic vests as missing or unrecoverable. The branch subsequently discovered three vests and 27 remained missing.”
The auditors noted that the “historical cost” of these missing vests is $12,419.
“It appears a lack of managerial oversight contributed to this condition,” said the auditors. “The Judicial Branch should strengthen internal controls over asset accountability to safeguard restricted items.”
The Judicial Branch agreed with the finding and acknowledged “the importance” of accountable oversight of the vests, “given the risks associated with unauthorized use.”
“While controls were in place for managing ballistic vests, we recognize the need to strengthen their implementation and oversight,” the Judicial Branch said. “To strengthen compliance, we will reinforce expectations and leverage technological tools to improve and automate the application of inventory procedures going forward. These efforts are intended to strengthen control, improve accuracy, and reduce the risk of similar issues going forward.”
The audit also found the Judicial Branch misclassified a total of $2.93 million in expenses. Of the 40 grant payments made to non-state organizations reviewed by the auditors, three payments, totaling $243,535, were miscoded. Misclassifications lead to the Branch having “less assurance that it properly reports its financial activities,” said the auditors, and again chalked the issue up to being caused by a “lack of management oversight.” The Judicial Branch agreed with the finding and said it has since notified staff of the proper code to use for grant-related fund transfers.
By law, the Judicial Branch must submit 23 reports to various legislative committees or state agencies, typically on an annual or biannual basis. Three of these reports, one regarding data for pretrial diversionary programs, another on juvenile detention statistics, and another regarding plans to address disproportionate involvement of minority juveniles in the justice system, were found by auditors to be submitted either late or not at all. The first report was submitted 22 days late, and the other two weren’t submitted at all.
“Our review of the Judicial Branch statutorily required reports disclosed three instances in which the Judicial Branch did not promptly submit reports,” said the auditors. “There is diminished executive and legislative oversight when the Judicial Branch does not promptly submit required reports.”
The Judicial Branch said there was “initial confusion as to which unit” should complete the first report, leading to an initial delay, but that it was “promptly produced and submitted” afterwards. Regarding the third report, the Branch said that the position at the state’s Office of Policy and Management that is supposed to review the report was “unfilled between 2017 until the fall of 2025,” but that once the Branch was notified it had been refilled, it produced and submitted the report in December 2025. The Branch said that it will automate its submission of the second report going forward.
The audit also uncovered deficiencies regarding the Judicial Branch’s overtime and compensatory time oversight, finding 11 instances in which employees failed to initial timesheets or receive supervisor approval for a total of 183 hours, or $8,781 worth of overtime. Auditors also found one employee had been paid nine hours of compensatory time they weren’t eligible to receive, two payments for which time sheets were unavailable, and ten payments that lacked employee signatures or supervisor approvals.
“The Judicial Branch did not enforce its attendance requirements, increasing the risk of errors or abuse,” said the auditors. “The Judicial Branch should ensure compliance with its internal control policies and procedures for awarding overtime and compensatory time.”
The Judicial Branch agreed with the finding and said it “will continue to work” to ensure that all timesheets will be properly signed, approved and retained moving forward. In the case of the employee who received ineligible compensatory time, the Judicial Branch said it was caused by the employee filing excess vacation time in error, and that “the amount of comp time earned was fully offset by vacation time taken.”
Additionally, the auditors found the Judicial Branch’s internal audit structure “lacks organizational independence,” that access to Judicial Branch systems for ex-employees was not promptly deactivated, and that the Branch’s IT department lacks a “comprehensive and tested disaster recovery plan” in case of emergency.
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