The Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC) was justified in finding that Stamford resident Matthew Olson is a vexatious requester according to the New Britain Superior Court.

In 2017, Connecticut passed a law allowing public agencies to submit petitions for relief from vexatious requesters (PRVR) to the FOIC. If the commission finds the petition is warranted and a requestor is labelled as vexatious, that agency does not have to respond to their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for one year.

Matthew Olson was the subject of several PRVR cases before the commission, the first filed by Stamford in 2020. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the petition was not acted on within the one-year timeframe established by the law and was administratively withdrawn. The town refiled the petition in November 2021.

The petition identified 32 FOIA requests filed with various departments in Stamford, with many requests focused on the city’s police and legal departments, which the petition stated began after Olson was asked by a police officer to move his parked vehicle. The petition also identified what it characterized as a pattern of behavior intended to use the FOIA process to harass officials with whom Olson was dissatisfied because he did not believe they had adequately handled his requests.

In November 2022, the FOIC released a final decision labeling Olson as a vexatious requestor. In December 2022, Olson filed a petition in New Britain Superior Court seeking an order to reverse the FOIC’s decision.

Olson’s petition made three primary claims:

1. that the FOIC “willfully and illegally created its own arbitrary and vague definition of vexatious requester.”
2. that the term “vexatious requester” in statute is unconstitutionally vague
3. and that the PRVR statute “constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination” under the state constitution

Olson’s first claim is a reference to the first PRVR case the commission handled. In its determination, and due to the lack of specificity of language in the PRVR statute, the FOIC adopted the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of “vexatious.” Olson’s petition argued that the FOIC did not have the authority to adopt this definition and should have looked at “common law principles.”

Olson’s complaint also alleged that the city used appeals to the FOIC as a “weapon to delay, deny, and discourage legitimate FOI requests” and that the PRVR case the city submitted relied on communication not related to his requests, which he argued “willfully ignored the intent of the statute and common law.”

He further claimed that, by withdrawing the initial petition and later refiling it, the city violated his due process rights.

But the Superior Court did not find Olson’s arguments persuasive.

In an August 30 order, judge Matthew Budzik found there was “substantial evidence” to support the FOIC’s vexatious requester finding and dismissed Olson’s appeal.

Budzik cited a previous ruling finding that, in the absence of specific definitions of statutory language, the FOIC can presume the legislature intended a word to have its plain English meaning. He therefore found the commission was justified in turning to the dictionary for a definition of “vexatious.”

“Because the commission adopted the ordinary and plan [sic] meaning to the statutory term “vexatious” as expressed in a dictionary, the court concludes that the commission did not misinterpret the meaning of that statutory term.” Budzik wrote.

On Olson’s vagueness claim, Budzik turned to another appeal against a PRVR finding. David Godbout was labelled a vexatious requester by the commission in February 2020. Godbout also appealed the finding to the Superior Court and made similar claims about the law being unconstitutionally vague. But Budzik, who also issued the finding in that case, rejected that characterization.

In analyzing a vexatious requester petition, Budzik wrote in the Godbout v. FOIC finding, the commission is directed to “consider whether a complaint is repetitious or cumulative, the nature and language of prior complaints, the nature and language of communications with commission staff and whether the claimant has a history of nonappearance before the commission, and any history of refusal to participate in settlement conferences sponsored by the commission’s ombudsman.” This requirement, Budzik continued, provides “a person of ordinary and reasonable intelligence fair notice of what conduct may trigger a refusal to hold a hearing” in a complaint brought to the FOIC by a vexatious requester.

Budzik did not consider Olson’s third claim because it was not adequately briefed by either party.

The FOIC will consider the ruling at its next meeting on September 11.

In the FOIC’s PRVR finding, the commission stayed Stamford’s ability to not respond to Olson’s requests until after a year until a final disposition from the court in the event Olson appealed the decision. This means the year-long period during which Stamford does not have to respond to requests from Olson has not yet begun. During the appeal, Olson twice tried unsuccessfully to have this stay overturned.

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